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Abstract 
An empirical analysis of credit constraints is undertaken using an endogenous switching 
regression model. The empirical results clearly show the potential positive effect of credit 
expansion for microenterprises. Contrary to conventional credit impact studies, however, the 
results suggest that microentrepreneurs are potentially capable of realizing high marginal rates of 
return, so that there is no justification for subsidized rates of interest for microenterprise credit. 
Microenterprise credit: Is there a need for subsidy? 
by 
Ma. Lucila A. Lapar and Douglas H. Graham 
Introduction 
Understanding the effect of credit constraints on the production behavior of 
microenterprises is essential to effective and realistic policy-making for microenterprise 
development. 1 This is particularly important in developing countries where credit constraints are 
more often the result of lack of access to formal sources of credit (Ho 1980, Anderson and 
Khambata 1981, Liedholm 1989, Duggleby et al. 1992, among others). Microentrepreneurs are 
more often perceived to be discriminated against in formal credit markets because of their lack 
of adequate and acceptable collateral (Binswanger and Sillers 1983, Eswaran and Kotwal 1986, 
1990). Hence, targeted credit at subsidized rates of interest is justified on the grounds that it 
breaks the entry barrier to formal finance and allows the relaxation of credit constraints faced by 
microenterprises. 
The assessment of the expected productivity gains obtained from an increased supply of 
credit is, however, an important issue that is underemphasized in subsidized credit programs. 
David and Meyer (1980) contend that it is difficult to to ascertain whether subsidized credit 
programs have a positive impact on production because of the fungibility of credit. If credit 
simply displaces another source of finance such as savings or if it is diverted to finance consump-
tion or other household activities, then it may have no effect on production. Moreover, the issue 
that microenterprises are indeed credit constrained has frequently been accepted as fact but never 
really empirically supported or validated. This paper contributes to the limited literature that 
seeks to provide empirical support for the effectiveness of credit policy for microenterprise 
development. It shows that there is empirical support to believe that microenterprises are credit 
constrained as a result of the prevailing inefficiencies in the credit market. In addition, relaxing 
the credit constraint through through an increased access to credit is shown to have a positive 
effect on production for microenterprises. 
The Methodology 
The effect of relaxing of a credit constraint can be analyzed using an endogenous switching 
regression model.2 Let Q(.) be the anticipated output supply, defmed as a function of loan size 
The analysis of the effect of credit constraint on the production of microenterprises is done within a household 
model framework in Lapar {1994). 
2 This is an adaptation of the model used by Sial and Carter (1992). 
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and other characteristics. Output for an enterprise "i" is produced according to one of the two 
production regimes: 
(1) Qi = { Qic - a;'Qi + ~'czi + (vic + eic) if a borrower, 
Qin - ~·nZi + ( vin + ein) if a nonborrower, 
where the base regime is the nonborrowing case. The implicit assumption in this framework is 
that microenterprise borrowers are able to relax their credit constraints. The right hand side 
variables include the observable and unobservable variables, where the observables are the Qi and 
Zj • The vector fi is a quadratic expansion of the loan amount L1 • The impact of loans on output 
supply is given by a;' fi , a nonlinear function of~ which allows for diminishing returns to loans. 
On the other hand, the vector zi includes variables that account for market opportunities, fued 
factors of capital and labor, and entrepreneurial characteristics, among others. The parameters 
~j (j=n,c) give the impact of the observable variables on output supply and are allowed to vary 
between the two regimes in (1) to allow for the possibility that a relaxed fmancial constraint may 
permit an individual to earn larger returns from a given market opportunity and level of fued 
factors. The latent variables are divided into those that are known (the vi's) and those that are not 
known (the e/s). The vi's give the effect of inherent enterprise and entrepreneur characteristics 
such as managerial and entrepreneurial skills on output supply. While these are known to the 
individual, they are not observed by the econometrician. It can be assumed that this latent 
variable is scaled such that E(vi) = 0 for an individual selected at random from the overall 
population of borrowing and nonborrowing microentrepreneurs. The v/s are allowed to differ 
across the two production regimes in the full switching regression specification to accommodate 
the productivity effect of differences in the attributes between borrowers and nonborrowers (e.g. , 
a relaxed credit constraint may result in larger returns to latent managerial ability). The ei's are 
the conventional, unanticipated random supply shocks that are unknown to the entrepreneur at the 
time the production decisions are made and it is assumed that E(eJ=O. 
Estimation of the parameters in the output supply equation (1) is complicated by the fact 
that credit status is endogenously determined in a way that may be systematically related to the 
expected credit effects (Carter 1989). Under this endogenous sorting, it is likely that borrowers 
have systematically different attributes from nonborrowers. Thus, while E(v0=0 for an individual 
randomly chosen from the overall population, it seems likely that the latent variable vi has a 
nonzero conditional expectation for the two non-randomly sorted subsamples of borrowers and 
nonborrowers. There is a need, therefore, to specify the non-random process that sorts 
individuals into borrowers and nonborrowers in order to obtain consistent estimates of the 
production regime parameters and identify the effect of credit. 
The process that sorts borrowers and nonborrowers into the two regimes involves the 
decision of the individual to apply for the loan and the decision of the lender to give the loan. 
This implies two selection criterion functions, where, say, I1* refers to the individual's decision 
whether or not to apply for a loan, and I2* refers to the lender's decision whether or not to grant 
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the loan. 3 The analysis of models with more than one selection criterion function like this one will 
depend critically on whether the two decisions are independent or correlated; that is, whether or 
not the co variances of the error terms in the two criterion functions are zero. If the covariance 
is zero, implying independence, then the estimation of the parameters of the model is feasible and 
tractable. However, if the covariance is not zero, implying non-independence, which in the case 
of the borrower and lender decision is a realistic assumption, then the estimation becomes more 
difficult because the expressions of the expected values of the error terms "get very messy." 
(Maddala 1983, p.282). In this case, the bivariate probit method is used to estimate the criterion 
functions. (See Fishe et al. 1981, for example). This approach is deemed not feasible in this 
study because of the lack of information on the decision-making process of the lenders, i.e., there 
is no information in the data set pertaining to the factors affecting lender's decisions whether or 
not to grant a loan. Thus, a second best approach is used wherein a single probit equation, which 
is an approximation of the two-probit equations, is specified as the criterion function. 4 Let this 
single probit equation be termed the credit status equation which should include factors affecting 
the individual's decision to apply for a loan and the lender's decision to grant the loan. In the 
absence of information from the lender's side, factors from the borrowers' side are used to infer 
lender behavior. 
Credit status can be represented by the binary variable Di which equals one if a borrower 
and zero otherwise. Di can be modelled as a result of a latent credit access variable,~~ , which 
is scaled such that an individual becomes a borrower when 5£i > 0. A reduced form specification 
for latent credit access can be written as: 
(2) 5£i = y'xi + 1li , 
Note that the individual's decision whether or not to apply for a loan and the lender's decision whether or not 
to grant a loan can be modelled as either as a sequential-decision process or a joint-decision process(see Maddala 1983). 
In both cases, there should ideally be two criterion functions to represent the individual's and the lender's separate 
decision choice, where the individual's criterion function can represent the demand for credit and the lender's criterion 
function, the supply of credit. However, if marginal and conditional inferences are needed to be made in the analysis, 
then the sequential-decision selection approach to model the criterion function may not be the appropriate approach (see 
Maddala 1983). The resulting truncation in the sample has been shown to affect the quality of the estimates ofthe 
parameters of the selectivity criterion even if it is still possible to correct for the selectivity bias in the OLS estimates 
of the parameters of the second stage equation (Maddala 1983, p.267). An alternative way of modelling the criterion 
function is to consider the individual's decision whether to apply for a loan and the lender's decision whether or not to 
grant a loan as a joint decision. This approach can be justified by the fact that what we actually observe is whether an 
individual is a borrower or a nonborrower and we do not observe the individual decisions of the individual borrower 
and the lender. 
4 It is recognized that the second best approach will not usually result in estimated parameters that are 
comparable with those obtained using the ideal model. In this case, the use of the single probit equation to approximate 
the two-probit criterion functions may result in biased estimates of the parameters of the criterion function. 
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where xi is a vector of variables that determine credit access, y is a vector of parameters, and 'I'J, 
is an error component reflecting random and latent factors that influence credit access. Thus, the 
sample separation process can be written as: 
(3) == { 1 if ~i == y'x, + 'I'Ji > 0, or TJi > -y'xi 
0 otherwise. 
The expected output supply conditional on the endogenous sample separation process and 
observable characteristics can then be written as: 
where conditioning on the observable variables z has been suppressed. 5 From (3) and (4), the 
full endogenous switching regressions system6 can then be written as: 
(5a) = { 1 if 'I'Ji > -y 'x, 
0 otherwise. 
Note that the conditional expectations on the right hand side of equations ( 4a) and ( 4b) can be written as: (i) 
E(v,c!D,=l) = E(yc ITl > -Y'?<) and (ii) E,-(;v ID =0) = J;;(v, ITJ < dx ). The problem of intrinsic productivity 
differences between borrowers and nonborrowers can be clearly seen from (i)and (ii). If latent productivity attributes 
are systematically related to credit status, then the conditional expectations in (4) will not be zero. For example, 
individuals with better entrepreneurial skills are likely to realize larger output supply (via V,0) as well as have higher 
probability of obtaining credit under non-random sorting (via T),), implying that E(M IP =1) >0 in the borrower 
subsample. Under these circumstances, estimating the output supply equation using OLS will not yield consistent 
estimates of the structural parameters because of the correlation between latent managerial skill and the observed loan 
amount. The direct output effect of latent managerial skill, in this case, is attributed to the observed loan amount with 
which it is correlated. 
The problematic correlation between the vi and Tli indicates that the latter in fact provides information on the 
latent variable vi. Thus, the parameters of interest can be consistently estimated by using this information to control for 
the latent characteristics v,c and v'". This can be done by making distributional assumptions to substitute for the latent 
information. From the sample selection literature, it is possible to separately identify the effect of latent individual 
attributes and obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters of the output supply function conditional on 
assumptions about the error structure. Following Madda!a (1983), assume that the error vector (TJi• vio v,J is distributed 
multivariate normal with zero expectations and positive defmite covariance matrix. This assumption allows the 
specification ofthe full switching model, where Pc=Cov(TJi ,V;0)Nar(TJJ and Pn=Cov(TJi>ViJNar(TJ,) are the population 
regression coefficients relating the vic and V;n , respectively; A.,"=Q>(Ci)/rl>(Ci) and A.t=Q>(CYl-ib(Ci) are the estimates of 
Tli given borrower type and Ci=y'x;N ar( Tli) ; Q>(.) and 4>(.) are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution 
functions, respectively. The parameters of this system can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods. Heckman 
proposes a two-stage procedure for estimating consistent but less efficient parameters of (5) (Maddala 1983). Consistent 
estimates of f3 may be obtained through separate OLS regressions of the two conditional output supply functions in ( 5). 
Alternatively, it is possible and often desirable to estimate (5) using all the observations in Q; (Maddala 1983). 
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Note that 
(6) E(Q) = E(QiciDi=l)Prob(Di=l) + E(QiniDi=O)Prob(Di=O), so that 
(7) E(Q) = P'nzi + o'[<P(C)z,] + cx'[<P(Ci)~J + (Pc- pJ<J>(Ci). 
From (7), the direct credit effect parameters, the a, and the indirect credit effect parameters, the 
o and the (Pc- pJ can be estimated. While the direct effect parameters give the increase in output 
supply due to the use of loans, the indirect credit effects represent the additional returns to 
observable and unobservable endowments when credit is used. If the use of credit does not 
enhance the returns to other factors, i.e., both o and (Pc- pJ are equal to zero, then (7) reduces 
to the following equation: 
Equation (8) is a restricted form of (7) wherein credit has direct effects only. 
Credit Effect Measures 
The credit effect measures 7 to be used in determining the effect of credit on output are 
defmed as follows: 
(9a) Random credit effect: 
(9b) Counterfactual credit effect for borrowers: 
E(QiciDi=l)- E(QiniDi=l) = [P'czi + cx'~i + E(viciDi=l)]- [P'nZi + E(viniDi=l)] 
= o'zi + cx'~i + (pc- pJ ')..ic· 
(9c) Counterfactual credit effect for nonborrowers: 
7 
E(QiciDi=O)- E(QiniDi=O) = [P'czi + cx'~i + E(viciDi=O)]- [p'nzi + E(viniDi=O)] 
= o'zi + cx'~i + (Pc- Pn) lt. 
See Carter (1989) and Sial and Carter (1992). 
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The random credit effect measure determines the effect of credit were it given to an individual 
selected at random from the overall population of rural nonfarm entrepreneurs. Equation (9a) 
shows the expected effect of credit if it were randomly assigned to an average individual without 
any intervening systematic selection or conditioning on the basis of the unobserved individual 
characteristics. Hence, the expected value of latent attributes for such an individual is zero. On 
the other hand, the counterfactual credit effect measure compares the output anticipated by an 
individual under the actual credit status with the output level that would be anticipated by that 
same individual in the counterfactual state (Tunali 1985, Carter 1989). Note that both 
counterfactual measures are in fact the sum of the random credit effect and the gains or losses the 
individual would anticipate given the latent characteristics. While the random credit effect can 
show the effect of credit on the output supply of an individual with the same observable attributes 
as the other individuals in the sample, the counterfactual credit effect can indicate the effect of 
credit on the output of individuals who choose to be or not to be borrowers. Thus, the hypothesis 
of a positive credit effect can be tested by looking at the estimates of potential output under the 
counterfactual state for both borrowers and nonborrowers. Notice that both the random and 
counterfactual effects are measures of the total effect of credit on output supply. In order to 
determine the marginal effect of additional credit on output supply, we use the marginal credit 
effect which is defined as the partial derivative of output with respect to loan amount. This 
measure is shown as: 
An estimate of the marginal effect of credit can be used to indirectly test the hypothesis that 
nonborrowers are credit constrained. If the estimated marginal returns to credit are greater than 
the shadow price of credit at zero loan, this implies that nonborrowers are credit constrained to 
the extent that an additional unit of loan would result in more than a unit increase in output. 
The credit access equation is empirically estimated as a function of factors that explain the 
borrower's demand for and supply of credit such as the value of fixed assets, total assets, and 
financial assets owned by the entrepreneur, previous year's income, number of years the 
enterprise has been operating, age of the owner/operator, number of years spent in school (as a 
measure of educational attainment), and a dummy variable for bank-client relationship, i.e., 
existence of a bank account, which equals one if the operator has a bank account and zero 
otherwise. Dummies for gender, type of activity undertaken, and province where the enterprise 
operates are also included. 
The output supply equation is empirically specified as a function of fixed and non-fixed 
inputs and other observable characteristics such as the entrepreneur's previous work experience, 
the average number of hours the enterprise operates during the period 1991, number of years the 
enterprise has been operating, among others. A quadratic form of the variable loan amount is 
included to account for the direct effect of credit on output. The loan variable represents the total 
value of loans received by borrowers during the period 1989-1991, i.e., the preceding two years 
and the current year of operation covered in the study. Dummy variables for province and type 
7 
of enterprise activity are also included in the equation. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the value of output. 
The data used in estimating the model were obtained from a survey of microenterprises 
in the Visayas region of the Philippines. The survey area included the provinces of Iloilo, Negros 
Occidental, Cebu, and Bohol where a higher degree of economic activity is observed relative to 
the other parts of the Visayas region. With Visayas considered as one of the growth centers in 
the Philippine government's latest Medium-Term Development Plan, it can be a potential hub of 
economic activity in the coming years implying better economic opportunities for microenterprises 
in the region. There were 400 sample enterprises in the data set, of which 125 were engaged in 
manufacturing, 164 with trading, and 111 with services (see Lapar 1994 for the description of the 
sampling design). 
Empirical Results 
The credit effects are estimated using the coefficients of the restricted model8 (equation 8). 
Note that of the estimated coefficients in the loan vector, namely the loan variable and its square, 
only the coefficient for the loan variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (see Table 
1). A test of joint significance of the two variables revealed, however, that the joint hypothesis 
that the coefficients are equal to zero is rejected at the 5 percent level. Hence, both coefficients 
are used in computing the credit effects. Table 2 shows the estimates for the credit effect 
measures discussed above. The random credit effect (equation 9a) is estimated to be 0.23 and is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, implying an increase of 23 percent in output for an 
average borrowing entrepreneur. The estimated random credit effect also empirically supports 
the hypothesis that non-credit users will potentially increase their output when credit is used. 
(Note that the random credit effect is equal to the counterfactual credit effect under the restricted 
specification of the switching regression model.) The marginal effect of credit is also shown to 
be positive (equation 10). At the mean loan size, credit is estimated to have a marginal effect of 
1. 73, implying that the marginal output effect of one morepeso of loan is Pl. 73 and this is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This estimated effect also implies that at the 
observed mean loan size of no thousand, the marginal return to credit is larger than the average 
cost of credit which is about 35 percent. When evaluated at zero loan size, the marginal credit 
effect is estimated to be 1. 79, implying a potential increase of more than a peso in output for 
every peso of loan. This estimate also indicates a 79percent shadow price of credit, suggesting 
a potentially high return to credit and indirectly supporting the hypothesis that nonborrowers are 
credit constrained. 
8 The restricted model was estimated to reflect the empirical results that borrowers do not obtain additional 
returns from observable variables and unobservable attributes, i.e., the estimated coefficients of o and (p. -pn) are not 
statistically significantly different from zero. See Lapar (1994) for a detailed discussion. 
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Table 1: Estimated coefficients of the endogenous switching regression model 
Full Switching Model Restricted Model 
All Borrower Variable Differential 
Constant -1.295507 9.251535 4.360621 
(-0.510) (2.364)** (6.829)* 
No. of family -0.017823 0.666508 0.273229 
workers (-0.073) (1.352) (2.800) .. 
No. of hired -0.180227 0.885918 0.167336 
workers (-1.018) (1.303) (2.269) .. 
Total assets 0.290907 -0.281013 0.145180 
(2.560)" (-1.340) (3.675)' 
Working capital 0.526370 -0.312765 0.394831 
(6.073)" (-1.672) (12.298)* 
Cost per hour 0.412604 -0.681619 0.137971 
of labor (in pesos) (2.574)" (-1.002) (2.391r· 
Age of enterprise 0.176075 -0.248552 0.074787 
(1.311) (-0.902) (1.369) 
Household size -0.044101 0.208046 -0.012624 
(-0.188) (0.427) (-0.137) 
Ave. no. ofhours 0.884029 -1.002134 0.344517 
operated (1.531) (-0.891) (1. 713)*"* 
Mfg. (dummy) 0.258388 -0.882149 -0.255514 
(0.437) (-0.852) (-2.037) .. 
Trdg. (dummy) 0.334885 -0.315130 -0.023815 
(0.512) (-0.216) (-0.191) 
Bohol (dummy) -0.763465 0.270541 -0.596292 
(-1.888)**" (0.285) (-3.631)" 
Iloilo (dummy) -0.312807 0.148047 -0.109236 
(-0.656) (0.141) (-0.816) 
Cebu (dummy) 0.594503 -0.476475 0.468399 
(1.884) ... (-0.607) (3.669)* 
Experience (dummy) 0.112733 0.128780 0.147340 
(0.475) (0.257) (1.513) 
Loans 0.00001087 0.000011758 
(2.213) .. (2.448)** 
Loans squared -1.04995xl0-11 -1.11392xl0-11 
(-1.263) (-1.366) 
Pdf 2.685880 
(1.358) 
Adj. R2 0.72 0.70 0.70 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
*Significant at 1 percent, **Significant at 5 percent, ***Significant at 10 percent. 
Source of Data: DRD-Survey of Rural Nonfarm Enterprises, 1992. 
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Table 2: Estimated values of credit effects 
Effect Estimated Value 
Random credit effect 
(at mean loan size) 
Marginal credit effect 
(at mean loan size) 
Marginal credit effect 
(at zero loan size) 
0.23079 
(0. 000004 )* 
1.7329 
(0.3242)* 
1.7940 
(0.3357)* 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Under the restricted switching regression 
specification, random credit effect is equal to the counterfactual effect. 
* Significant at 1 percent. 
Source of Data: Table 1. 
Some Policy Implications 
The empirical results obtained in the study raise several issues pertaining to the 
development of microenterprises as well as rural credit market policies in the Philippines. Despite 
efforts to liberalize the rural credit market and make it more efficient, the prevailing conditions 
still have not made a substantial impact in addressing the credit constraint problem of 
microentrepreneurs. On the other hand, the empirical results clearly indicate a potential positive 
impact of microenterprise credit expansion. This result is consistent with the results of traditional 
credit impact studies in the past. However, contrary to the usual policy prescriptions of traditional 
credit projects (e.g., subsidized interest rates, creation of institutions for direct targeting of credit 
to a particular clientele, among others), the results obtained from this study point to a different 
set of policy implications. The empirical results clearly suggest that the policy of no interest rate 
subsidy for loans to microenterprises is justified. There has always been a perception that the 
only way to successfully implement a microenterprise credit program is through subsidized loan 
rates to a specific group or clientele. There are strong indications in this study that 
microentrepreneurs are capable of realizing high rates of return on capital so that they are 
potentially capable of paying market rates of interest. 
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